

THE DAILY CHATTANOOGA REBEL ARMY EDITION.

THE DAILY REBEL.

GRIFFIN, Ga.

TUESDAY EVENING, SEPT. 13, 1864.

**NOTE.—The Rev. Dr. J. B. McFann, of Nash-
ville, will preach at the Methodist Church to-night,
(Tuesday) at the usual hour.**

**Gen. Sherman and the Question of Ex-
change.**

The correspondence between Gen. Hood and Sherman, which we laid before our readers in this morning's issue, will attract the attention of the people of both governments, not only as an account of the conduct of the two generals on the score of dignity, but because it involves points of the first consequence in other than a military point of view.

Gen. Sherman promptly accepted Gen. Hood's proposition, for an exchange of prisoners, upon the basis of the Cartel herefore agreed upon, between the two governments; but upon reflection, he found that he had gained no special advantage, and all the Yankees in him immediately repented of such a trade. He therefore wrote a second letter, more consistent with his true character, because it was utterly wanting in dignity and common fairness.

The important point of the correspondence, is General Sherman's refusal to exchange the Confederates in his hands for the Federal soldiers in our prisons, whose terms have expired at the possession of Atlanta.

The press of the South has insisted, for some time past, that the real ground of the refusal of the Yankee government to execute their cartel, was, that the terms of so large a portion of their soldiers in our hands had expired, and that, therefore, they would be swapping soldiers for non-combatants. General Sherman confesses this motive and this policy in his letter to General Hood. His refusal to exchange our men, who, by the terms of their enlistment, are soldiers during the war, for any but his own men, who are so situated that they can be immediately placed in the ranks of his army, and then, with a want of dignity disgracing an officer holding so high and responsible a position, he proposed to exchange a parcel of "fellows," whom he says, he has picked up in the streets of Atlanta, for prisoners in our hands not captured from his command, thus making a degrading distinction between the soldiers of his army and those of the other armies of his own government. A more rankless proposition could hardly be conceived, and could only come from a man heartless and beastly enough to expect women and children from their homes.

The reasons which dictate the Yankee government to refuse compliance with the stipulations and requirements of the Cartel, are now before the world. After a long series of contemptible evasions and prevarications, Gen. Sherman, either in his malignity, or his stupidity, has blurted out the truth. The soldiers of the Confederacy are soldiers for the war. The soldiers of the Yankee government are enlisted for three years, and the terms of a large number of those we hold, are either about to expire, or have already expired. An exchange, would therefore benefit us, without helping them.

It is not to be wondered at, that the Lincoln government has hesitated to avow so cold-blooded, unprincipled, and treacherous a policy. It is a shocking to good morals, as it is repugnant to honor and fair dealing. These men, for whom it now refuses to exchange "rebels," have faithfully served out the time for which they enlisted. While others deserted, they remained true to the flag they had sworn to uphold; and although the purpose for which the war was to have been waged, when they should arms for their vindication, have been perverted, and the emancipation of the slaves, substituted for the restoration of the Union, those men remained faithful.

They have encountered the hardships and endured the privations and incurred the dangers of as hard and wasting a three year term of service as ever men were called upon to bear. And now, after all this self-sacrificing devotion, because they have been so unfortunate as to be taken captive, the government for which they have surrendered the services of hosts, and imperiled their lives in an arduous battle-field, abandons them to their fate, and leaves them to die in Southern prisons because they can be of no further use.

Though we have long believed that the reason assigned for the refusal to exchange, was the fact, we did not expect the Lincoln government abandoned, unprincipled, and shameless as it is, to admit it; and we are disposed to believe that the audacity now, is owing more to the blundering stupidity of Sherman, than to any design on the part of the government that should be made public.

We are confirmed in this impression by the fact, that while Sherman at Atlanta, proposes to exchange prisoners, excluding those whom terms have expired, the telegraph furnishes us with a synopsis of a publication just made by Beast Butler upon this subject, in which he declares that "the Confederate authorities are willing to exchange colored soldiers, heretofore claimed as slaves in the Confederate States, the principal difficulty affecting an exchange will be removed."

It is not as clear as daylight that the Yankee Government is playing a double game, rocking with disunity and bad faith on every side. If it had had a good name to lose, it would long since have furnished by its bad faith towards us in this matter of exchange as well as by the infamous treachery it has practised towards its own soldiers, when every requirement of honor and decency demanded that it should care for and protect. But unfortunately for us, as well as for the prisoners we hold, a government in Atlanta, dependent upon resistance and resistance to the death, and with these terrible odds it prepared for the contest.

Gen. Sherman reported his loss in the battle of Jonesboro' at twelve hundred. An officer of our army who recently went over the ground where the Yankees killed were buried, informs us that he saw not less than six hundred graves. He counted sixty-eight killed in a single regiment, which he was able to distinguish by the marks upon the尸骨.

Taking the usual average of four wounded to one killed, and we have three thousand in Sherman's loss instead of the twelve hundred he reports.

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As soon as Lee left, Hardee was obliged to stretch out his corps in single rank to cover the ground occupied the day previous by the two corps. This left the command without any reserves, and with this inadequate force in a thin, attenuated line, General Hardee had to prepare for the gathering storm which was soon to burst upon his devoted host, with the odds of six to one. This gallant general which had braved the storm, and swept its vengeful path on many a hard fought field, was now in a most critical situation, and was upon the brink of being sacrificed. It could not retreat—it must fight and hold its ground; for the safety of Hood's army in Atlanta depended upon resistance and resistance to the death, and with these terrible odds it prepared for the contest.

The enemy was discovered by two o'clock in the afternoon, opposed to our whole front in the threatening attitude of attack, and at the same time stretching far around to our right, for the purpose of turning our position. We had to meet the movement as best we could by an extension of our lines, and the throwing up of such temporary breastworks of logs and rails, as the brief time allowed would permit.

The Yankees were commanded by Sherman in person, and that sagacious soldier believed he would only have two corps to fight, though he doubt, he would have an easy time in utterly demolishing this section of Hood's army, and then turning on the others, crush them in detail, and thus destroy the last hope of the rebels in this case. It was certainly a bright and promising picture to flatter the ambition of the federal hero, and the chivalry of Ireland vastly in his favor, especially as he had only one corps to contend against, instead of two, as he had contemplated. But a hand of true and faithful heroes stood in his way, and the fight which Hardee's corps made on the afternoon of that memorable day, in the presence of the combined Yankee army, will appear in history as an instance of the most glorious and determined resistance ever made in warfare upon any battle field.

About half past four o'clock, the storm of battle was poured upon our lines for more than two hours; the deafening and unceasing roar of the mighty cataract of living fire, which leaped together in a chain of blood, from opposing sides, told the tale of death and destruction which was being enacted. It was a terrible moment of suspense to all concerned, and after the fight had progressed about an hour, still greater was the excitement when it became known that a small party of ours had been broken. There was a salient or sharp angle on our right, near the railroad, which was occupied by Gen. Geary's Arkansas brigade, with Lewis' Kentucky brigade on the right of it; and Granberry's Texas brigade on the left, and the position supported by

**Special Correspondent of the Rebel]
A Review of the Fall of Atlanta.**

IN THE FIELD,

NEAR LOVETTSBURG, Sept. 4, 1864.

The events of the past week are full of thrilling interest, and will form a remarkable chapter in the history of this eventful campaign.

On the morning of the 27th of August, it was discovered that the enemy had abandoned during the night, about four miles of their line of works in front of Atlanta, and immediately commencing the march of concentration. This gave rise to various conjectures in regard to the state of affairs. The garrison one thought it was the first step towards the grand retreat so long talked about, and with great rejoicing, they believed that a few days would see Sherman flying in confusion back to his northern home. These few days were anxious moments to the weary soldiers and patriots of the Army of Tennessee. But it only required a few days to develop the fact beyond controversy that Sherman was marching: and moreover, that he was steering upon a grand military expedition around the headwaters of our army.

He abandoned his base at the Railroad bridge over the Chattahoochee, established a new line of communication river down the river at Sandtown, thence wagons to Marietta, and with one Army corps left on the banks of the Chattahoochee, in front of Atlanta, as a corps of men and observation, he took the remainder of his army, comprising six corps, with twenty days provisions in his wagons, commenced his grand strategy for the possession of Atlanta.

For some days it was difficult to determine his position and movements, as he kept a heavy fire of cavalry before us to screen his forces from observation, and had the advantage, too, of having a stream of water on his flank as he was moving down on the west bank of Flint River. This enabled him to collect a large force in the vicinity of Jonesboro' twenty miles below Atlanta, before his plans were fully developed. We had at Jonesboro' on the morning of the 30th of August, only Lewis' Kentucky brigade, and Reynolds' Arkansas brigade, which had been sent down a few days previous to guard the road against a raid, and this small force was the nucleus around which our other forces were soon to assemble.

The enemy crossed Flint river opposite Jonesboro, late in the afternoon of the 30th ultimo, with a strong corps and made lodgments on the banks of the river and, maintaining his position. Our commanding General, Hood, resolved to strike this force, for this purpose detached Hardee's corps to make the attack, while he remained in Atlanta, with Stewart's corps and the Georgia militia. Hood continued Southward for twenty miles without encountering opposition, while Gen. Sherman was supposed to have camped near the mouth of the stream.

The movement of Federal troops south had now come to the knowledge of the rebel general, but he conceived it to be only a big raid, composed of probably a corps or two of infantry, contemplating the effectual destruction of the Macon Railroad for some time. Accordingly, Hood, with the corps of Hardee and Longstreet, came up the line of march for Lovejoy, while Stewart's corps and the Georgia militia were left to garrison Atlanta.

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